We construct a theoretical framework that describes the social worth of a microfinance organization in terms of the depth, worth to users, cost to users, breadth, length, and scope of its output. We then analyze evidence of depth of outreach for five microfinance organizations in Bolivia. Most of the poor households reached by the microfinance organizations were near the poverty line-they were the richest of the poor. Group lenders had more depth of outreach than individual lenders. The urban poorest were more likely to be borrowers, but rural borrowers were more likely to be among the poorest.
Introduction
The professed goal of public support for microcredit is to improve the welfare of poor households through better access to small loans. Often public funds for microfinance organizations carry a mandate to serve the poorest (Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, 1995) . For example, the Microcredit Summit in February 1997 rallied support to seek more than $20 billion to provide microcredit to 100 million of the poorest households in the next ten years (Microcredit Summit, 1996) .
Microcredit is the newest darling of the aid community. In Latin America, most of the excitement is based on the fame of a few of the best microfinance organizations.
These include BancoSol, Caja Los Andes, PRODEM, FIE, and Sartawi in Bolivia; Caja Social in Colombia; ADEMI in the Dominican Republic; Financiera Calpiá in El Salvador; Compartamos in México; and ACP/MiBanco in Perú. Worldwide, the bestknown microfinance organizations are the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and the unit desa system of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Yaron, Benjamin, and Piprek, 1997) . Grameen and BRI reach millions of depositors and borrowers, and many if not most are poor women. A survey of 200 of the thousands of microfinance organizations worldwide 2 found 13 million loans worth $7 billion outstanding as of September 1995 (Paxton, 1996) .
Although microcredit has claimed more and more of the aid budget, it may not always be the best way to help the poorest (Buckley, 1997; Rogaly, 1996) . The fervor for microcredit may siphon funds from other projects that might help the poor more.
Governments and donors should know whether the poor gain more from more small loans than from, for example, more health care, food aid, or cash gifts.
Is public support for microcredit wasted or worthwhile? No one knows. Most measures of the impact of microfinance organizations fail to control for what would have happened in their absence (Sebstad, Barnes, and Chen, 1995; Von Pischke and Adams, 1980) . If users borrow more than once, then they must get benefits. The question, however, is not whether microfinance is better than nothing for its users. The question is whether microfinance is better than some other development project for the poor as a whole.
We construct a theoretical framework for rigorous thought about the social worth of the output of a microfinance organization. The framework puts the standard theory of project analysis in terms of the jargon of microcredit. By defining precisely the social worth of service to the poorest, the framework helps to judge the trade-offs between service to the poorest and service to others. The goal is to render more explicit the judgements used to allot public funds.
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We also address three empirical questions with evidence from a comparison of the poverty of a treatment group-borrowers of five microfinance organizations in La Paz, Bolivia-with the poverty of a control group-the population of La Paz. The first empirical question is whether microfinance organizations reach the poorest of the poor (Gulli, 1998; Hulme and Mosley, 1996) . We find that the five microfinance organizations in Bolivia most often reached not the poorest of the poor but rather those just above and just below the poverty line. The theoretical framework lays out the conditions under which these microfinance organizations may still have been a good use of public funds meant to help the poor.
The second question is whether group loans reach the poorest better than individual loans. Although the theory is well-developed (Conning, 1997; Sadoulet, 1997) , less is known about when the assumptions of theory hold in practice. We find that group lenders in Bolivia reached the poorest better than individual lenders.
The third question is whether rural lenders reach the poorest better than urban lenders. Rural poverty is both wide and deep, but, compared with urban lenders, rural lenders must deal with more seasonality, worse information, greater risks, less smooth cash flows, longer distances, more diversity, and sparser populations. We find that the share of the poorest in the portfolio was highest for rural lenders. We also find that because the urban lenders had more borrowers, the share of the urban poorest who were borrowers exceeded the share of the rural poorest who were borrowers.
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Section 2 below defines outreach. Section 3 briefly describes the empirical methods. Section 4 compares the distribution of an index of the fulfillment of basic needs for borrowers with the distribution of a similar measure for the population.
Section 5 concludes.
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A Theoretical Framework for Outreach
Judgements of the performance of microfinance organizations have been based on the concepts of outreach and sustainability (Yaron, 1994) . Here, we express outreach and sustainability in terms of the theory of social welfare. The purpose is to reconcile the jargon of microcredit with the standard tools of project analysis.
Outreach is the social value of the output of a microfinance organization in terms of depth, worth to users, cost to users, breadth, length, and scope.
1 Outreach is commonly proxied by the sex or poverty of borrowers, the size or the terms of loan contracts, the price and transaction costs borne by users, the number of users, the financial and organizational strength of the lender, and the number of products offered, including deposits.
Sustainability is permanence. The social goal is not to have sustainable microfinance organizations but rather to maximize expected social value minus social cost discounted through time. In principle, sustainability is not necessary nor sufficient for social optimality. In practice, however, sustainable organizations tend to improve welfare the most. Most unsustainable microfinance organizations inflict costs on the poor in the future in excess of the gains enjoyed by the poor now. Sustainability is not an end in itself but rather a means to the end of improved social welfare (Rhyne, 1998) .
Thus outreach stands for the social value of loans from a microfinance organization, and sustainability helps to maximize expected social value minus social 6 cost discounted through time, including the net gain of users from loans and deposits, the profits or losses of the microfinance organization, and the social opportunity cost of the resources used. Sustainability affects outreach because permanency tends to lead to structures of incentives and constraints that prompt all the groups of stakeholders in a lender to act in ways that increase the difference between social value and social cost.
In principle, a complete evaluation would use cost-benefit analysis or costeffectiveness analysis to compare social value with social cost in general equilibrium. In practice, it is so expensive to measure social value and social cost that almost all talk proceeds in terms of outreach and sustainability in partial equilibrium.
Six aspects of outreach
Depth
Depth of outreach is the value that society attaches to the net gain from the use of microcredit by a given borrower. Because society places more weight on the poor than on the rich, poverty is a good proxy for depth. For example, society likely values the net gain from a small loan for a street kid or for a widow more than the same gains for a richer person.
Deeper outreach usually increases not only social value but also social cost. As income and wealth decrease, it costs more for a lender to judge the risk of a loan. This happens because, compared with the rich, the poor are more heterogeneous and less able to signal their ability and willingness to repay (Conning, 1999) . Fixed costs also 7 matter more for the poor because their loans are shorter and smaller and have more frequent installments, renewals, and disbursements.
Deeper outreach increases only social value and not social cost when a lender finds better ways to judge risk at a cost less than the savings from the better judgement. Such progress increases access, the ability and willingness to borrow and to repay at a price that covers the long-run cost of an efficient producer. Access is the nexus of creditworthiness-demand based on ability and willingness to repay-and the lending technology-supply based on an efficient way to judge creditworthiness. More access is progress because loans depend more on the creditworthiness of the borrower and less on the constraints of the lender to judge creditworthiness. For example, a lender that does not need physical collateral to judge creditworthiness could serve poorer users and thus have deeper outreach, all else constant, than a lender that requires physical collateral.
Worth to users
Worth of outreach to users is how much a borrower is willing to pay for a loan.
Worth depends on the loan contract and on the tastes, constraints, and opportunities of the user. With the cost to the user constant, more worth means more net gain.
Cost to users
Cost of outreach to users is the cost of a loan to a borrower. This is distinct from the cost of a loan to society or from the cost of a loan to a lender. Cost to users 8 includes both price and transaction costs. Price includes interest and fees. Prices paid by the user are revenues for the lender. Transaction costs are non-price costs. They include both non-cash opportunity costs-such as the value of the time to get and to repay a loan-and loan-related cash expenses such as transport, documents, food, and taxes. Transaction costs borne by the user are not revenues for the lender.
The three aspects of depth, worth to users, and cost to users are tightly linked but still distinct. Net gain is the difference between worth to a user and cost to a user.
It is the highest cost that the borrower would agree to bear to get the loan, minus the cost that the borrower does in fact bear. In turn, depth of outreach reflects the social value attached to the net gain of a specific person. For example, $100 of net gain for a poor person may be worth more to society than $500 of net gain for a rich person.
Costs to users can be measured as the present value of the cash flows and transaction costs associated with a loan. Worth to users is more difficult to measure.
Still, the relative worth of two or more loan contracts can be compared through their costs. If a borrower has alternative sources of loans, then net gain can be measured as the cost savings of a switch to a microfinance lender.
Breadth
Breadth of outreach is the number of users. Breadth matters because the poor are many but the aid dollars are few.
Length
Length of outreach is the time frame in which a microfinance organization produces loans. Length matters because society cares about the welfare of the poor both now and in the future. Without length of outreach, a microfinance organization may improve social welfare in the short term but wreck its ability to do so in the long term.
In theory, a perpetual source of support can allow a microfinance organization to achieve length of outreach without sustainability (Morduch, 1998a; Woller, Dunford, and Woodworth, 1998) . In principle, such an organization could live a long time. In practice, however, longer outreach through sustainability usually strengthens the structures of incentives that serve to maximize expected social value minus social cost discounted through time. Without length, borrowers have few selfish reasons to repay because the lender cannot promise to lend again in the future. Loan losses shorten length of outreach in a downward spiral. Likewise, lack of profits prompts employees to strip the lender bare and to bask in perks before the chance is gone.
Scope
Scope of outreach is the number of types of financial contracts offered by a microfinance organization. In practice, the microfinance organizations with the best outreach produce both small loans and small deposits. Deposits matter for two reasons.
First, all poor people are depositworthy and save to smooth consumption, to finance investment, and to buffer risk. In contrast, not all poor people are creditworthy. Second, deposits strengthen the incentives for sustainability and length of outreach. Depositors shun microfinance organizations if they do not expect them to live to return their deposits. To attract and to keep deposits, a microfinance organization must please not donors and government but rather users and regulators.
Trade-offs and feedback among the six aspects
Depth is the social value of worth to users minus cost to users. Breadth counts users, length counts years of service, and scope counts types of contracts. These six aspects of outreach are useful because direct measures of the social value of microfinance are expensive. Outreach is worth minus cost, weighted by depth, summed across breadth of users and scope of contracts, and discounted through length of time.
Social welfare depends on depth, worth, cost, breadth, length, and scope, but the greatest of these is length. In particular, more length in the short term requires more profit. This means higher prices, more cost to users, and less net gain per user. In the long term, however, the trade-off may vanish if the push for length leads to innovations in technology and organization that increase profits and/or increase worth to users without parallel increases in social cost or in cost to users. Increased length feeds back to decrease social cost because length gives users more selfish reasons to repay. More scope also increases worth to users and strengthens the incentives that boost length.
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The debate over the social value of sustainability hinges on the effect of length.
Microfinance organizations that do not aim for sustainability believe that the shortterm increase in net gain caused by low prices swamps the effects of reduced length from low profits. Lenders that aim for sustainability believe the converse.
The rest of this paper looks at evidence of depth of outreach for five microfinance organizations in Bolivia. Even if society cares only for the poorest, however, the theoretical framework highlights that social welfare depends on more than only depth.
Breadth affects the number of the poorest served, and cost and worth to users affect the net gain. The poorest can use not only loans but also deposits, not only now but also in the future.
Poverty of Borrowers from 5 Bolivian Lenders
The organizations
By Latin American standards, Bolivia is a poor country. GNP per capita in 1997 was about $950 (World Bank, 1999) . The income distribution was highly skewed, and rural households in particular were very poor (UNDP, 1996) . Still, Bolivia is a flagship for microcredit in Latin America and in the world (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997a) .
At the end of 1995, two of the five Bolivian microfinance organizations were regulated, and three were NGOs. The three NGOs were Centro de Fomento a Iniciativas Económicas (FIE), Fundación para la Promoción y Desarrollo de la Microempresa (PRODEM), and Fundación Sartawi. BancoSol, the best-known microfinance organization in Latin America, is a bank that was split off from PRODEM (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997b; Schreiner, 1997; Mosley, 1996) . Caja de Ahorro y Préstamo Los Andes is a regulated non-bank (Rock, 1997 Bulletin, 1998) . They all aim to reduce poverty, but none explicitly targets the poor.
Bolivia, while sparsely peopled, may have the densest microcredit in the world.
The five microfinance organizations studied here are the most important of the about 30 in Bolivia. They account for more than half of both clients and portfolio outstanding (La Razón, 1997) .
The data
In November and December of 1995, we surveyed a random sample of 622 of the more than 52,000 borrowers active with the five lenders at the end of September in the urban areas in and near La Paz and in the rural Altiplano near Lake Titicaca. Of the 588 cases with complete data, 221 came from BancoSol, 124 from Caja Los Andes, 91 from FIE, 83 from Sartawi, and 69 from PRODEM (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1996) .
An index of fulfillment of basic needs 3.3.1 Conceptual issues
A vast literature explores the measurement of poverty (Lipton and Ravaillon, 1995) . Here, we matched some questions in our survey of borrowers with questions in 1992 national poverty assessment (Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1995) . The questions measured household use of goods and services thought to be linked with the fulfillment of basic needs.
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The answers were condensed in an Index of Fulfillment of Basic Needs. This approach is common in Latin America. It requires (Boltvinik, 1994) : 
Empirical issues
The nationwide assessment picked the indicators, their norms, and the poverty line. In most cases, the norm was the median of an indicator, but some cases had more complex norms. Like all measures of absolute poverty, the poverty line and the norms were at least somewhat arbitrary. The index was computed not for individuals but for 
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The range of the ratio of x j to x jnorm depended on the range of answers in the nationwide assessment. The indicator for education was the average of indices for individual members of a household: 
Evidence of Depth of Outreach
The population of La Paz
Two features stand out about the shares of the population of urban and rural La Paz in each of the four poverty classes (Table 1 ). The first is the extent of poverty. In 1992, more than half the urban households were poor, and almost all rural households were poor. The second is the depth of rural poverty. Not only were 96 percent of rural households poor, but 74 percent were among the poorest. In contrast, 17 percent of the urban households were in the poorest class. Poverty in Bolivia, especially rural poverty, was broad and deep.
Borrowers of the five lenders 4.2.1 Distribution of the IFBN
A box-and-whisker plot (Tukey, 1977) depicts the distribution of the IFBN for borrowers of the five lenders (Figure 1 ). We do not have data for a similar picture for the rural and urban populations. The IFBN is on the vertical axis. The poverty line is at 0.9. The microfinance organizations are ordered from shallowest to deepest outreach.
The width of each box reflects the sample size for each lender. For example, the box for BancoSol (n = 221) is wider than the box of PRODEM (n = 69).
The height of the boxes marks the interquartile distance, the range between the second and third quartiles of the distribution. Less-disperse distributions have shorter 20 boxes. For example, the box for PRODEM is shorter than the box for Sartawi because the distribution of PRODEM is more clustered near the median.
The whiskers beyond the boxes bracket either the extreme points in the data or 1.5 times the interquartile distance from the median, whichever is less. In a Gaussian distribution, more than 99 percent of the data are inside the whiskers. The horizontal lines beyond the whiskers mark outliers.
The grey trapezoids in the center of each box bound a 95-percent confidence interval for the estimated median. FIE had the highest median. Half the sample of FIE had an IFBN of more than 1.02, and the other half had an IFBN of less than 1.02. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejected the hypothesis that any of the distributions were
Gaussian, so differences in medians were tested non-parametrically with Wilcoxon ranksums (Hollander and Wolfe, 1973) . The median of FIE (1.02) is greater than that of Caja Los Andes (0.97) with more than 95-percent confidence. The borrowers of these two urban individual lenders clustered just above the poverty line in the threshold class. The median for BancoSol, the urban group lender, was at the poverty line (0.90).
This is less than the other two urban medians with more than 99-percent confidence.
The median rural borrower in Sartawi (0.71) and in PRODEM (0.67) were moderately poor. The rural medians were statistically smaller than the urban medians, but they were not statistically different from each other.
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The same pattern of three depths of outreach in suggested both by the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for differences in medians and by the non-parametric KolmogorovSmirnov tests for differences in the distributions of the IFBN: 
Distribution of the IFBN for borrowers versus the population
We compare the estimated distribution of the IFBN among the poverty classes for the sample of borrowers from the five lenders with the known distribution of a similar measure for all urban and rural households in La Paz (Table 1) . Because the estimated share of borrowers in a poverty class is a random variable, we report nonparametric bootstrapped 90-percent confidence intervals (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993 ).
We do not expect the sample and population distributions to match because creditworthiness and demand for microcredit depend in part on income and assets. All else constant, lenders can judge creditworthiness for rich people easier than for poor people. Suppose a lender drew borrowers at random from the subset of the population that, given its lending technology, had demand and was creditworthy. Then the profile of borrowers, compared with the population, would be skewed toward the rich.
We do not know the exact profile of demand and creditworthiness in Bolivia.
Still, we can answer four useful questions. The first asks whether the poorest had the 22 same share in the portfolio as in the population. The second asks how many of the poorest were reached. The third and fourth questions ask how depth compared between group and individual loan technologies and between rural and urban market niches.
Depth of outreach to the poorest of the poor 4.3.1 The share of the poorest in the portfolio and in the population
Of all households in urban La Paz, 45 percent were non-poor ( share than the population. Caja Los Andes and BancoSol had a smaller share of borrowers in the fulfilled class than did the population, and FIE had a bigger share.
For the moderately poor, the share was lower in FIE and in Caja Los Andes (both 29 percent) than in the population (38 percent). The share for BancoSol was higher than in the population (47 percent). For the poorest, the shares of all three urban lenders (2 to 5 percent) were smaller than in the population share (17 percent).
Thus, compared with the population, the urban lenders lent less to the fulfilled and to the poorest and more to the poorest of the rich (threshold) and, in the case of BancoSol, to the richest of the poor (moderate).
The same pattern holds in rural La Paz. The non-poor were 5 percent of all rural households but 14 percent of PRODEM and 13 percent of Sartawi. In all rural households, 22 percent were moderately poor, and 74 percent were among the poorest.
For PRODEM, 54 percent were moderately poor, and 33 percent were among the poorest. For Sartawi, 49 percent were moderately poor, and 36 percent were among the poorest. All of the differences are statistically significant.
Except for the fulfilled class and for the moderately poor in BancoSol, the profile of borrowers of each of the five lenders is, compared with the profile of the population, skewed toward the threshold class. This does not prove much, however, about depth of outreach. What matters is not whether the microfinance organizations reached the poorest of the poor but whether they reached the poorest of those who demanded loans and who were creditworthy. Our data cannot answer this question.
The number of the poorest in the portfolio
If a lender has broad outreach, then it might reach many of the poorest even though they are not a big share of the portfolio (Rosenberg, 1996) . Table 2 contains point estimates of the share of the portfolio in a poverty class multiplied by the total number borrowers from these lenders in La Paz.
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The five lenders reached about 4,500 of the poorest, 1,900 urban and 2,600 rural.
This number is derived from the relative share of the poorest in a portfolio and from the absolute size of the portfolio. For example, the share of the poorest was about 4 percent in Caja Los Andes and about 5 percent in BancoSol. With about 30,000 total borrowers, BancoSol served about 1,400 of the poorest, while Caja Los Andes, with 9,200 total borrowers, served about 370. FIE, with the lowest share of the poorest (2 percent) and the smallest urban portfolio, had about 120 borrowers among the poorest.
The rural lenders were smaller than the urban lenders, but the share of the poorest in their portfolios was higher. The effect of the greater share swamped the effect of the smaller portfolio. PRODEM, with about 2,500 borrowers in rural La Paz, served about 800 of the poorest, more than twice as much as Caja Los Andes. Sartawi, with about 4,900 borrowers, had about 1,800 among the poorest. This is 400 more than
BancoSol and almost as many as for all three urban lenders combined.
About 4,500 of the poorest households in La Paz had debt from the five lenders in late 1995. Is this deep outreach? One way to check is market penetration, the ratio of borrowers in a given class in a given lender to the number of households in that class in the population (Table 3) surveyed. This is much less than the urban penetration, but we do not know how much is possible because rural microcredit is more difficult than urban microcredit.
The five Bolivian lenders reached the richest of the poor and the poorest of the rich much more than they reached the poorest of the poor. This does not necessarily mean that they did a bad job. A loan that is not repaid is a gift. Although there is nothing wrong with a gift, a gift in loans' clothing may backfire (Krahnen and Schmidt, 1994; Adams, Graham, and Von Pischke, 1984) . Also, outreach depends not only on depth for the poorest but also on breadth, worth to users, cost to users, length, and scope for all users. These lenders have uncommon breadth, worth, cost, and length.
Furthermore, BancoSol and Caja Los Andes take deposits and so have especially wide scope.
Depth by loan technology
Because both rural lenders use group loans, we look at technology only for the urban lenders so as not to confound the effects of technology with the effects of market niche. Compared with the individual lenders FIE and Caja Los Andes, the group lender BancoSol had the smallest shares in the fulfilled and threshold classes and the biggest shares in the moderate and poorest classes ( Figure 1 and Table 1 ). BancoSol also had the most market penetration, reaching almost one-fourth of the households in the threshold class and 15 percent of the moderately poor (Table 3) .
As a rule, the group-lending technology has more potential for deep outreach because it can substitute joint liability for physical collateral. Joint liability has high transaction costs, and it can also have high cash costs if borrowers must repay the debts of their comrades. Still, group loans attract those who cannot or will not post physical collateral. In contrast, individual loans appeal to richer borrowers who can post physical collateral and who want to avoid the costs of joint liability.
BancoSol had both the deepest and the broadest outreach of the urban lenders.
This does not necessarily mean that BancoSol had the best outreach overall because the comparison ignores cost to users, worth to users, length, and scope. 
Depth by geographic market niche
At first glance, rural lenders seem to have deeper outreach than urban lenders (Table 1) . About 86-87 percent of the rural borrowers were among the poor, compared to 31-52 percent for urban borrowers. In fact, this comparison is not valid because it does not control for the different distributions of poverty in urban and rural areas. Table 4 does control for this. Each cell is the share of the portfolio in a given poverty class for a given lender divided by the share of the population in the poverty class from Table 1 . A ratio of more than 1 means that the share of clients in that class was greater than the share of the population in that class. A ratio of less than 1 means the opposite.
If the poor were more concentrated in a microfinance organization than in the population, then the ratios in Table 4 would increase from less than 1 in the leftmost columns to more than 1 in the rightmost columns. In fact, the pattern is the opposite.
For all five lenders, the ratios start near or above 1 in the leftmost column for the fulfilled and exceed 2 for the threshold class. The ratios decrease for the moderately poor and then decrease still more for the poorest. As seen before, the profile of borrowers is skewed, not toward the poorest but toward those near the poverty line.
The details of the broad pattern differ, however, for rural and urban lenders. For example, in the threshold class, no urban lender had a ratio above 3.0, while the ratio for PRODEM was 4.8 and for Sartawi was 4.4. The rural lenders mined the few nonpoor households more intensely than the many poor households.
Among the moderately poor and the poorest, the rural lenders had higher ratios and thus deeper outreach than the urban lenders. This is a puzzle. If rural lending is more difficult than urban lending, then why did rural lenders have more depth? The answer is probably that the urban lenders had not yet exhausted their non-poor niches.
In contrast, the lack of a large number of non-poor borrowers pushed the rural lenders to the poorest. For rural lenders, the ratios of the share of the threshold class to the population share is 4.8 and 4.4, and the ratios for the moderately poor class are 2.4 and 2.2. For urban lenders, the threshold ratios are between 2 and 3, and the moderate ratios are near 1. The rural lenders serve the niches of the richest of the poor and the poorest of the rich much more intensely than the urban lenders. The absolute number of rural non-poor households is small, however, and so the rural lenders turn sooner and more often to the most difficult of all clienteles, the rural poorest. The greater depth of the rural lenders suggests that the urban lenders may not yet reach all of the urban poorest who are creditworthy and who want loans.
In terms of market penetration (Table 3) 
Summary and Conclusions
We analyzed the depth of outreach of five microfinance organizations in La Paz, Bolivia. The first step was to construct a theoretical framework in which depth is one of six aspects of outreach. The second step was to compare the poverty of a sample of the borrowers of the five lenders with the poverty of all the households in La Paz.
We found five main results. First, improved social welfare from microcredit depends not only on depth of outreach but also on worth, cost, breadth, length, and scope. Length matters most because the drive for length leads to incentives that prompt improvements in the other aspects. Second, the lenders in La Paz tended to serve not the poorest but rather those near the poverty line. Most microfinance organizations will probably serve this same niche. The poorest are less likely to be creditworthy and to demand loans, and many of the non-poor can borrow elsewhere. Third, because the distribution of demand and creditworthiness unconditional on supply is unknown, we cannot say whether the Bolivian lenders had deep outreach in an absolute sense.
Fourth, group lenders in La Paz had deeper outreach than individual lenders. In general, group technologies have more potential for deep outreach because they substitute joint liability for physical collateral. Fifth, the rural lenders in La Paz had deeper outreach than the urban lenders in that the typical rural borrower was more likely to be among the poorest. At the same time, the urban lenders had more market penetration among the poorest due to their bigger portfolios.
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These results on depth of outreach do not tell whether the five microfinance organizations did well in terms of all six aspects of outreach. On the one hand, perhaps the drive for length and breadth is what prompted these lenders to grow and to have some depth. On the other hand, perhaps these lenders would have reached more of the poorest had they stayed small and unprofitable with a single-minded focus on depth.
The theoretical framework described here can help to improve social welfare by making more explicit the judgements that back the choice of which focus to take.
The empirical results sketch some of the limits of microcredit for the poorest of the poor. They highlight the need for more scrutiny of the flood of funds budgeted in the name of access to loans for the poorest. Even when microcredit does reach the poorest, it may not increase incomes as much as smooth consumption and diversify income (Mosley and Hulme, 1998; Morduch, 1998b) . Even if it turns out that microfinance organizations do not reach relatively or even absolutely many of the poorest, this shallow depth may be more than balanced by net gains that accrue to those near the poverty line.
Microcredit may or may not be a good development gamble. If donors and governments have social welfare in mind, then they should check whether microcredit is the best way to spend public funds earmarked for development. Is microcredit worthwhile or worthless? The theoretical framework here is a better way to judge this than simple measures of the number of the poorest served by a lender. 
